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This paper investigates the development, issuance, structuring, and expected performance of the 
trust preferred securities collateralized debt obligation (TruPS CDO) market. Developed as a 
way to provide capital markets access to smaller banks, thrifts, insurance companies, and real 
estate investment trusts (REITs) by pooling the issuance of TruPS into marketable CDOs, the 
market grew to $60 billion of issuance from its inception in 2000 through its abrupt halt in 2007. 
As evidenced by rating agency downgrades, current performance, and estimates from our own 
model, TruPS CDOs are likely to perform poorly. Using data and valuation software from the 
leading provider of such information, we estimate that large numbers of the subordinated bonds 
and some senior bonds will be either fully or partially written down, even if no further defaults 
occur going forward.  The primary reason for these losses is that the underlying collateral of 
TruPS CDOs is small, unrated banks whose primary asset is commercial real estate (CRE). 
During their years of greatest issuance from 2003 to 2007, the booming real estate market and 
record low number of bank failures masked the underlying risks that are now manifest. Another 
reason for the poor performance of bank TruPS CDOs is that smaller banks became a primary 
investor in the mezzanine tranches of   bank TruPS CDOs, something that is also complicating 
regulators’ resolutions of failed banks. To understand how this came about, we explore in detail 
the symbiotic relationship between dealers and rating agencies and how they modeled and sold 
TruPS CDOs. In our concluding comments, we provide several lessons learned for policymakers, 
regulators, and market participants.   3 
 
The Trust Preferred CDO Market: 
From Start to (Expected) Finish 
 
I.  Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has led to monumental changes in everything from securities markets, 
to regulations, to accounting policy. Researchers have only just begun to investigate the 
determinants of the crisis and to propose appropriate policy responses. This paper investigates 
the development, issuance, structuring, and expected performance of the trust preferred securities 
collateralized debt obligation (TruPS CDO) market, as well as offering policy recommendations. 
While only a niche part of the structured finance CDO market at $60 billion of issuance, Fitch, 
the rating agency that rated all but one TruPS CDO, reports that over 1,800 banks have placed 
TruPS into TruPS CDOs. Experts have estimated that banks have purchased some $12 billion of 
TruPS CDOs, mostly in mezzanine classes of the CDOs, which means that banks became a 
primary investor in the debt of the banking industry.
2 Banking experts estimate that successfully 
resolving TruPS claims at failed banks could save taxpayers billions of dollars as well as 
substantially improve the valuations of existing TruPS CDOs.
3 This in-depth study of the TruPS 
CDO market provides important insights into how markets respond to regulations; how dealers 
and rating agencies interact to develop models; how ratings are developed and adjusted over 
time; and how accounting rules were changed to value untraded securities in response to the 
illiquidity of structured products during the crisis. This study is also one of the very first of its 
kind to conduct empirical analysis with Intex
©, the primary source of data and valuation software 
for ABS/MBS markets. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we examine the background and development 
of TruPS and the TruPS CDO market. Then we conduct a review of the literature, most 
importantly the development of rating agency models from published research reports from 
investment banks and Moody’s, press releases, and discussions with analysts central to the 
development of the TruPS CDO market. Of particular importance is the symbiotic relationship 
between rating agencies and investment banks in the development of the research on TruPS 
CDOs that contributed to the development of rating agency models. In Section III, we examine 
the specifics of the TruPS CDO structure needed to generate our loss estimates and securities 
prices. In Section IV, we discuss our source data from Intex, the FDIC, and rating agencies. Our 
summary statistics include analysis of the TruPS CDO market by vintage, comparisons across 
subgroups, original and current rating agency ratings, and comparison of bank failure rates in 
TruPS CDOs against the broader market. In Section V, we describe our stylized benchmarking 
model used to estimate losses and securities prices. In Section VI, we present our results, where 





Moody’s internal models. Second, we summarize our cumulative loss estimates for 785 active 
TruPS CDO securities, the preponderance of all securities in the market. Third, we estimate 
securities prices using 2009 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidance to reflect 
losses for non-traded debt securities. Even if no further deferrals or defaults occur with TruPS, 
we estimate that substantial numbers of the subordinated bonds will be either fully or partially 
written down.  In Section VII, we draw our conclusions and lessons learned.  
II.  Background on TruPS and TruPS CDOs and Review of the Literature 
a.  Background on TruPS and TruPS CDOs 
The trust preferred securities (TruPS) market begins with the decision by the Federal Reserve 
System to approve for bank holding companies (BHCs) the use of up to 25% of TruPS for Tier 1 
capital for regulatory accounting purposes, the very highest form of capital allowed for banks.
4 
For banks and thrifts, TruPS are issued out of a special-purpose subsidiary that is wholly owned 
by the parent company (see left panel of Figure 1). To be eligible as Tier 1 capital, TruPS must 
provide for a minimum five-year consecutive deferral period on distributions to shareholders. In 
addition, the intercompany loan would need to be subordinated to all other forms of debt (i.e., 
just above preferred shares in the capital structure) and “have the longest feasible maturity,”
5 
which in practice came to mean a non-amortizing 30-year term. TruPS also generally have call 
provisions giving issuers the option to pay off, typically set at 5 to 10 years, and thereafter. 
The reason TruPS at insured depositories are held only at the BHC level is that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) opposed the Fed’s decision to allow banks to count 
TruPS as Tier 1 capital for regulatory accounting purposes. This has resulted in TruPS being 
issued at the holding company level, which is regulated by the Federal Reserve, and not at the 
bank level, where the FDIC has its insurance. The FDIC had at least three major objections. 
First, TruPS are perpetual and have cumulative dividend structures and thus are more 
appropriately classified as debt, even though their deferral period can last as long as five years. 
Second, the FDIC argued that TruPS are treated as debt by rating agencies and under generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)) starting in 2004 after issuance of FIN 46R.
6 Finally, 
their presence in the BHC puts stress on bank subsidiaries to upstream dividends to the BHC to 
service trust preferred investors. Partly in response to these concerns, the Federal Reserve would 
later exclude goodwill and tax-deferred assets as qualifying assets to count toward the 25% ratio. 








for the TruPS CDO market, meant this limitation applied only to the very largest BHCs that 
could issue TruPS in public debt markets.
7 
A major benefit of TruPS that proved crucial for their growth is that, for tax purposes, their 
dividends are a tax-deductible interest expense, unlike dividends paid on directly issued 
preferred stock, and did not dilute existing shareholder value. By the first quarter of 2010, $150 
billion of TruPS were on BHC balance sheets.  
The growth of the TruPS market presented a special dilemma for banks that were both too small 
and unrated or not highly rated enough to access public debt or private placement markets. This 
problem was addressed in 2000 when a capital markets team at Salomon Smith Barney came up 
with the idea of pooling TruPS into CDOs. As depicted in the right panel of Figure 1, TruPS 
were pooled as assets into TruPS CDOs with a senior/subordinated liability structure with 
tranches, or slices, of equity and fixed income securities with ratings ranging from BB to AAA 
for the fixed-income securities. The first TruPS CDO was issued on March 31, 2000 and was 
underwritten and managed by Salomon Smith Barney.
8 
The introduction of TruPS CDOs “helped the market explode.”
9 As shown in Table 1, between 
2000 and 2007, TruPS CDO issuance reached $58.9 billion, with 108 separate deals comprising 
collateral mainly across banks, thrifts, insurance companies, and REITs.
10 These deals were 
issued under SEC 144A rules,
11 a status that allowed TruPS CDOs to be unregistered and gave 
CDO issuers and trustees the right to provide very limited disclosure.  
One of the most important decisions made by dealers was to withhold the names of issuers of the 
underlying TruPS. According to one issuer, the nondisclosure practice evolved because dealers 
wanted to keep their customer base confidential, despite exhortations from rating agencies to 
disclose names. Critically, the limited disclosure, relatively small issuance volumes, and 
concentration in single industries helped ensure a concentrated base of dealers and collateral 
managers and, ultimately, a limited base of investors too. For the bank TruPS CDOs, this meant 
that banks became the primary investors in securities from the banking industry. As shown in 
Table 2, the top five dealers issued over 80% of TruPS CDOs. Some of these dealers also serve 















who invested in TruPS CDOs, one estimate from Red Pines Advisors LLC, a consultancy that 
values illiquid assets, put the figure of bank purchases of TruPS CDOs at $12 billion. If this 
figure is correct and if it is also true that, as quoted below, banks mainly purchased the 
mezzanine tranches of these securities, this means that banks were a primary investor, if not the 
primary investor, in TruPS CDO mezzanine bonds.  
What was also not known by investors until after banks started failing was that the same banks 
were issued into many CDOs. Fitch developed a practice of reporting names of defaulted banks 
in monthly research reports, but only after banks filed for bankruptcy or had been taken over by 
regulators. One example: Fitch (2010b) reports that Indy Mac, the second largest thrift failure, 
appears in 28 separate TruPS CDOs, more than a quarter of all TruPS CDOs issued! On average, 
failed banks and thrifts were included in 4.2 separate TruPS CDOs.  
These interlocking relationships combined with limited disclosure proved advantageous to 
dealers and deal managers, but they raise issues about risk management practices at banks. The 
second largest dealer, Merrill Lynch, responsible for some of the most important research on 
TruPS CDOs, described the relationships this way: 
Early TruPS transactions were ‘blind pools’, where investors did not have access to 
collateral specifics. Although most TruPS CDO trustee reporting does not include 
specifics on the collateral, it is common for originators to provide collateral information 
and analysis to investors in their deals.
12 
In essence, early TruPS CDO investors were relying largely on rating agency ratings and 
surveillance from the dealers responsible for issuing TruPS CDOs. More recently, this lack of 
disclosure has been the subject of lawsuits against dealers and rating agencies.
13 
A review of the literature for this paper shows that, until the market experienced substantial 
stress, analysis of TruPS CDOs was almost exclusively done by analysts with a direct economic 
interest in the deals: dealers, rating agencies, collateral managers, and consulting firms for banks. 
This dominance of the analysis and control of information was recognized early on as an 
important contributor to the investor base of TruPS CDOs being concentrated within the issuing 
industries. Merrill Lynch (2004) described the primary reason for the very large spreads on 
AAA-rated bonds of TruPS CDOs relative to other sectors this way: 
Few investors are familiar with this collateral relative to most CDO subsectors as it was 
not possible to invest in the debt of mid-market banks and insurers prior to 2000. In fact, 









Merrill (2004) did identify the central risks of TruPS CDOs, namely, that they were investments 
in deeply subordinated debt of unrated banks whose principal investment was CRE. As they 
state, “One can view investing in TruPS as an indirect investment in CRE.” Later they state, 
“Most TruPS issuers that pool securities into CDOs are small and unrated.”
 15 
The success of TruPS CDO issuance was undoubtedly influenced by existing market conditions, 
characterized by a booming real estate market and record low bank failures. In 2004, CRE was 
exhibiting superior performance at the height of the real estate boom, as were banks investing in 
CRE. As shown in Figure 2, bank and thrift failures or assists dropped off dramatically after 
2002, when there were 11. From 2003 to 2007 bank failures/assists totaled 10, the lowest five-
year total on record in the history of the FDIC. The only two-year period of no bank failures 
since 1934 was 2005-06, the period of the largest TruPS CDO issuance. 
Missing from these research reports is a critical assessment of rating agency models, particularly 
around asset correlations and diversification benefits, which, as experience would show, were 
made much worse by banks issuing TruPS into multiple deals and banks being the primary 
investors in  bank TruPS CDOs. It was only after the TruPS CDO market came under stress that 
analysts critically examined these inherent risks:  
Too many banks ended up buying the mezzanine tranches of the CDOs, which went bust 
faster than the highest-rated ones, according to Siegel, who left Citigroup to co-found 
New York-based Stone Castle Partners LLC, which manages about $3.1 billion, 
including TruPS CDOs. He said he didn’t realize that was happening as the market grew 
and was “shocked” at disclosures about what banks had bought. 
“Smaller banks should not have been buying any kind of structured paper” except for 
simple government-guaranteed mortgage securities, Siegel said. “Unfortunately, too 
much of this paper has landed back at banks, which really wasn’t what should have 
happened.” 
As the quote from Merrill (2004) above confirms, concentrated bank holdings of TruPS CDOs 
were publicly disclosed as early as 2004, yet rating agencies made few, if any, adjustments for 
this fact nor did we find evidence that issuers or other analysts expressed any concerns until after 
the TruPS CDO market came undone.  
What the financial crisis did to end the TruPS CDO market, the U.S. Congress did to end 
issuance of future TruPS as equity capital for regulatory accounting purposes, although virtually 
all existing bank TruPS in TruPS CDOs are exempt from restrictions. The Collins Amendment to 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) eliminated trust 




depositories. For trust preferred securities issued before May 19, 2010, there will be a phase-in of 
exclusions in the Tier 1 capital incrementally from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2016 for large 
BHCs (defined as more than $15 billion in assets as of December 31, 2009), whereas for 
medium-sized BHCs (less than $15 billion but more than $500 million in assets as of December 
31, 2009), the inclusion in Tier 1 capital is grandfathered. Small BHCs with $500 million in 
assets or less, however, are exempt from exclusions of trust preferred securities as Tier 1 capital, 
as well as from risk-based capital and leverage capital requirements in the act and in the 
amendment.
16 Thus, because most banks issuing TruPS in TruPS CDOs are under $15 billion, 
the old regulatory accounting rules still apply. 
b.  Review of the Literature 
A review of the literature begins by reviewing the symbiotic relationship between rating agencies 
research and that conducted by investment banks. Rating agencies’ research is especially 
important, not only because their ratings were a critical element in making TruPS CDOs 
marketable, but because the three major rating agencies were the only entities that knew the 
issuers of TruPS assets in all TruPS CDOs. The three major rating agencies collectively rated all 
108 TruPS CDOs. For the 681 bonds in the 108 CDOs, Fitch rated 678, all but three and all but 
one deal, Moody’s rated 511 (75%) and S&P rated 362 (53%). We will explore these ratings in 
more detail below. 
The rating agencies developed models independently, but their models had many similarities and 
were driven by at least three key inputs: recoveries; internally generated default models of the 
industries represented in the TruPS CDO (mostly banking, insurance, and REITs); and 
correlation coefficients across industries and within and across regions represented by groups of 
U.S. states. The correlation assumptions were most important for the initial rationale for single 
industry TruPS CDOs, even if later they were not central to downgrade decisions. As Moody’s 
(2004, p. 1) put it, “The assumptions regarding pool diversity are particularly important because 
Trust Security CDOs are effectively single industry transactions.” Overall, the rating agencies 
took similar approaches to rating TruPS CDOs and, when the market turned, also downgraded in 
similar ways and at similar times. To gain an understanding of how these models evolved, we 
will focus on Moody’s research related to rating bank TruPS CDOs because they provided the 
most detailed descriptions of their ratings methodology, and model revisions. 
The central challenge in rating bank TruPS CDOs was, as Moody’s (2004, p. 3) put it, that 
“financial institutions that issue Trust Securities in a CDO typically have not accessed the capital 
markets and do not have a credit rating.” For any TruPS CDO pool, the standard approach of 
Moody’s was to assign a weighted average rating factor (WARF), which is effectively a 10-year 
pool-wide cumulative default probability from Moody’s “Idealized Default Rate Table,”
17 and 





have ratings, Moody’s approach from 2000 to 2007 was to assign, with certain restrictions on the 
banks, a WARF of 480, which corresponded to a Baa3 (or BBB) rating, consistent, they argued, 
with FDIC default data.
18 This rating was further augmented with additional restrictions from 
internal models.
19 Thus, on the unrated banks in a TruPS CDO, this 480 translated into a 10-year 
cumulative default rate of 4.8% (=480/10,000). Since the TruPS themselves were 30-year 
securities, Moody’s Default Rate Tables extrapolated out 30 years. A TruPS CDO of 480 yielded 
for 30 years, by their calculations, a cumulative default rate of around 17.5%.
20  
Assignment of correlation assumptions were particularly difficult for TruPS CDOs because, as 
Moody’s (2004, p. 5) put it, “CDOs of Trust Securities have broken new ground by being the 
first single-industry transactions.” Moody’s addressed this in two ways. First, it limited any 
TruPS from an unrated bank to 3% of the total pool balance, meaning that a TruPS CDO made 
up entirely of securities from unrated banks had to have at least 33 securities. (Rated credits were 
assigned a 5% limit.) Second, Moody’s derived its correlation assumptions off its “alternative 
Diversity Score methodology,” which assigns U.S. banks to one of five regions.
21 Each region is 
considered a separate industry for purposes of calculating of its diversity score. Based on its 
methodology, Moody’s assumes default correlations of 20% within a region and zero correlation 
across different regions.
 22  
The genesis of much of the underlying assumptions about choice of states included in bank 
regions and asset correlations came from research at Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) conducted in 
the late 1990s and published between 2000 and 2002. (See Salomon Smith Barney 2001, 2002.) 
It was SSB that came up with the concept of dividing banks into five distinct regions and 
considering them as uncorrelated separate industries for modeling purposes. Moody’s five 
regions were divided up exactly the same as SSB’s, save for one small state (Arkansas); SSB 
also adopted the zero interregional correlation assumption in its models. Fitch rated the first 
TruPS CDO and worked closely with SSB on this deal. While Fitch used six regions instead of 
five, it adopted zero intra- and inter-region correlation assumptions. In its influential 2001 paper, 
















It is noteworthy that the theoretical foundations for the zero correlation inter-regional assumption 
in the SSB work was based on a model by Lucas (1995) developed for letters of credit-backed 
(LOC) debt that requires default of both debt holder and debt obligor, obviously not a condition 
for bank failures. According to SSB (2001, p. 11), this calculated “binomial event” correlation 
was 0.0024, while the alternative correlation coefficient for default rates across the five regions 
was a significantly higher 25%. Their rationale for the zero correlation assumption was stated 
this way: 
The most important feature [of bank failures] is the fact that while every region had a 
period of significant default activity, none of the peaks in default activity coincide with 
one another (SSB (2001), p. 11). 
Moody’s described its reasoning for the zero inter-regional correlation this way: 
Even though there have been spikes in defaults over the past 30 years, they have not 
occurred at the same time. Rather, the spikes have tended to occur at different times 
within the different regions…. It is assumed that banks are highly correlated within a 
region but are uncorrelated across the five specified regions. We currently assume that 
the default correlation within a region is 20% (Moody’s (2004), p. 6). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate analytically the effects of correlation 
assumptions on bond structures and pricing; we do not have asset detail on TruPS CDOs to 
conduct such an analysis in any case. That will have to wait until more information is disclosed. 
It is noteworthy nonetheless that the empirical justification for treating bank regions as separate 
industries with a zero inter-regional correlation assumption for TruPS CDOs in SSB 2001, and 
adopted by rating agencies, was based on a correlation approach developed for an unrelated class 
of securities.  
Where the rating agencies did differ significantly from SSB was in their assumptions on the level 
of lifetime default rates used to calculate expected losses. SSB (2002) argued for use of the 
1970-2001 period for calculating bank default rates; over this time period, 30-year default rates 
were just under 7%. The rating agencies chose to include much longer histories that included the 
Great Depression. As mentioned, Moody’s adoption of a Baa3 implied default rate resulted in a 
30-year expected default rate of 17.5%. So whatever the difficulties presented by correlation 
assumptions, default rates of 17.5% for banks during a period of record low bank failures and 
record low CRE losses must have seemed more than adequate by rating agencies.  
Finally, assumptions on recovery values were complicated by the fact that TruPS were relatively 
new instruments, starting only in 1996, with no history of defaults. While banks had the option to 
defer on interest for up to five years, Moody’s assumed that deferral of interest on TruPS “was 
tantamount to default” and assumed that all deferrals would ultimately default.




TruPS deferring on non-defaulted institutions are treated the same as TruPS on institutions that 
have defaulted (i.e., filed for bankruptcy or been seized by regulators) for enhancement level test 
purposes.  
The rating agencies’ methodologies remained unchanged through 2007 because, as mentioned 
previously, bank failures were at all time lows through 2007. As late as March 11, 2008, 
Moody’s had not changed a rating on a single bank TruPS CDO tranche and predicted that 
“ratings in 2008 should remain stable.”
25 This had changed considerably by July 2008, when 
Moody’s placed 182 tranches on 72 TruPS CDOs on review for possible downgrades, almost 
one-quarter of all TruPS CDO bonds, completing the downgrades of 77 tranches in August.
26 
The actions were prompted by enhancement level tests, or “triggers,” failing due to a sudden rise 
in deferrals among banks. When this happened, interest was deferred on the lower-rated tranches, 
prompting rating downgrades.  
The November 12, 2008 Moody’s press release proved a watershed event in the TruPS CDO 
market, as Moody’s announced several significant changes to its TruPS CDO ratings 
methodology (see Moody’s (2008d)). Moody’s revamped its methodology for calculating the 
default probabilities on banks by augmenting them with two accounting-based risk ratios. If 
either of these ratios was above certain thresholds, Moody’s assumed that these banks had 
defaulted with zero recovery; for lesser thresholds, they received a rating factor of 6500, 
consistent with a Caa2 (or CCC) rating.
 27 For banks below the thresholds without public ratings, 
Moody’s capped bank ratings at 360 (consistent with a Baa2 (or BBB-) default probability). 
Recall that initially, the convention was to assume a Baa3 rating for unrated banks; now 
Moody’s was assuming a Baa2 maximum. Based on figures on ratings distributions from a 2009 
report, this meant that around 37% of all TruPS were downgraded to Baa2, effectively truncating 
the grade distribution of commercial banks and thrifts at Baa2.  Further, to account for 
deteriorating market conditions of the banking industry, pool-wide default probabilities were 
multiplied by 1.25. For asset correlations, Moody’s increased the inter-regional correlation to 
10% from zero; the intra-regional correlation had been increased to 45% from 20% in 2007. 
While the correlation assumptions were critical to the creation of a TruPS CDO market, Moody’s 
noted that the changes it made to its correlation assumptions were not central to their downgrade 














With these model adjustments, Moody’s downgraded 180 tranches across 44 TruPS CDOs, over 
20% of all bonds in the market. As a result of these “dramatic changes to rating agency 
methodology,” Siegel (2009, p. 32) predicted that the “capital markets driven TPS market [was] 
unlikely to return,”
28 a forecast certain to be true.
29 Fitch and S&P took different approaches in 
their models, but by the end of 2008, downgrades were similar across all three rating agencies. 
Ratings downgrades are further analyzed below.  
The very significant changes to rating agency models should also be placed in historical context. 
These ratings revisions were made at the same time as ratings revisions on the structured finance 
(SF) CDO market were being made, as the rating agencies came under attack for downgrades in 
the SF CDO market that contributed so significantly to the financial panic of 2007.
30 By the time 
of the changes to the rating agency models, issuance had completely dried up. After we examine 
features of TruPS CDO deal structures, we will examine current conditions in the market and 
then provide our loss estimates. 
III.  Features of TruPS CDO Deal Structures 
Before presenting our model and empirical results, we describe the major features of TruPS 
CDO deal structures, unique for each deal, that are necessary for estimating losses. To start, the 
cash “waterfall” of a deal, displayed in the right panel of Figure 1, determines how the principal 
and interest, the revenue of a deal, are allocated among fixed income and residual claimants, as 
well as how losses and expenses are allocated. In addition to the waterfall, various other features 
of deals protect bondholders, particularly the senior bondholders, against unexpectedly high 
losses. As we will show, these additional features have significant effects on current and 
expected cash flows and must be accounted for to generate loss estimates and valuations. Some 
of the features described are standard for the typical senior/subordinated structure of structured 
finance CDOs, while some are unique to the TruPS CDO structure itself. We will describe only 
those features of structures that figure most prominently in our valuations. 
a.  Subordination 
Subordination is the central feature of many private-label deals in ABS/MBS markets because it 
determines how revenues and losses get allocated to fixed and residual security holders, 
particularly when the deal is performing as expected. Subordination in the TruPS CDO tranche is 
the total amount of credit support provided by all junior bonds to a given tranche in the same 
deal and serves to absorb any losses before this subject tranche experiences any losses.  The 
subordination share is therefore the share of the remaining balance of a deal that provides a 







protection the bond has against losses. Higher-rated bonds therefore have more subordination, 
while lower-rated bonds have much less. In Tables 3(a) and 3(b), we summarize the 
subordination shares and discount margins at issuance across vintages and on a weighted average 
basis for the 108 TruPS CDOs to gain insights into expected risks, since subordination levels and 
discount margins reflect investors ex ante views on risk. For comparison, we gathered a sample 
of mortgage-backed cash mezzanine structured finance CDOs (SF CDOs), which we also report 
in the tables.
31 
A somewhat unique feature for TruPS CDOs, at least relative to other SF CDOs, is the very high 
levels of subordination and discount margins for the senior-most classes, those originally rated 
AAA to AA. Subordination levels for the senior AAA bonds averaged 48.03%, although it did 
trend down some after 2002 as issuance climbed. Table 3(b) shows Senior AAA TruPS CDO 
floating rate notes have, on average, 10 basis points more in margin than Senior AAA structured 
finance CDOs, which is quite a substantial spread pick-up for investors, even as it trended down 
over time. Junior AAA bonds reflect, on average, 15% higher levels of subordination than SF 
CDOs, with almost identical spreads. This combination of spread and discount margins reflects 
the perceived riskiness of the TruPS CDO market to AAA investors. 
Note that the pattern is quite different for the more junior-rated securities, which were the 
securities for which, as noted in reports above, the primary investors were the banks, thrifts, and 
insurance companies issuing TruPS.  Lower-rated TruPS CDO tranches enjoy higher 
subordination levels than their SF CDO counterparts as well, although by lesser amounts. 
However, TruPS CDO floating rate notes originally rated AA to BB, have lower discount 
margins than their SF CDO counterparts. This is a pattern you would observe for securities for 
which risk is viewed as more comparable.
32 One possible explanation for these differences in 
perceived risks is that banks, thrifts, and insurance companies perceived much lower risk among 
these securities than did the broader market, which bought the AAA-rated bonds. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these differences in more detail, we make the point 
here and will discuss further in our lessons learned. 
b.  Excess spread 
Since bonds are fixed income securities, the first line of protection against losses for the 
bondholders, and the sole revenue source for the equity tranches, is from the excess spread on the 
deal. Excess spread for TruPS CDOs is the interest cash-flow from the underlying collateral net 










hedging costs. Excess spread provides the first layer of credit protection against the defaults and 
losses from the CDO collateral. TruPS CDOs often divert a portion of the excess spread to pay 
down debts even before the violation of any other tests meant to protect bondholders. Usually 
this amortization, also known as “turbo,” occurs in reverse order of seniority to reduce the most 
costly debt tranches in the deal structure, or pro rata across the CDO debt tranches to maintain 
the deal leverage mechanism. Since these features are unique for each structure, we will need to 
account for these in each security when we estimate our losses.  
c.  Reserve Accounts (RAs) 
RAs for the TruPS CDOs can either be set up at the initial deal closing from the proceeds of 
CDO issuance or built up from the excess spread until the reserve account reaches the target 
amount, which is usually 0.25 to 0.75% of the original deal balance. Funds in RAs can be drawn 
to pay senior administrative expenses or senior note interest as required and thus provide 
additional support to the TruPS CDOs.  Any draws made from the account can be replenished 
from the excess spread if the collateral performance improves and the transaction generates 
enough cash flow. 
d.  Hedges/Swaps 
Hedges and/or swaps are structured in most TruPS CDO transactions to mitigate the risks of 
interest rate mismatches between the very long-term 30-year fixed-rate TruPS debts in the 
collateral and the floating rate TruPS CDO liability. Owing to the growing percentage of 
deferring/defaulting collateral assets (the fixed-rate TruPS debt collateral, in particular) and the 
historically low current interest rate environment, some TruPS CDOs have been negatively 
affected by the large imbalances in the fixed-floating interest rate swaps, which require the deals 
to make significant payments to the hedge counterparties, even as these same deals are facing 
dwindling cash flows.  Since hedge payments are senior to the interest payments to even the 
AAA-rated notes and non-payment of interest to the senior notes constitutes an event of default, 
TruPS CDOs lacking the ability to reduce the swap notional or unwind the hedge are at risk of 
experiencing cash shortfalls and triggering an event of default to the deals.  
e.  Overcollateralization (OC) Tests and Interest Coverage (IC) Tests 
OC and IC “triggers” are features designed to protect bonds, particularly the more senior bonds, 
against higher than expected losses. The traditional OC tests operate in the same way in TruPS 
CDOs as in most deals, but with some twists. If defaults or deferrals rise above preset levels, first 
excess spread gets diverted, then subordinated bonds stop receiving principal and interest (P&I) 
payments. When triggers hit on subordinated bonds, they start to “PIK,” an acronym that stands 
for payment in kind, which means that the bonds start diverting P&I payments and start 
accumulating interest arrears. (This is a result of the TruPS themselves being cumulative debt.) 
Typically, the mezzanine, or more junior bond, triggers trip first (“sub-tests”). If losses rise, then 
the senior, or AAA-rated bond, triggers fail (“sr. tests”). For purposes of the OC tests, a deferral 15 
 
of interest is treated the same as a default, and deferrals are given a significant haircut in 
calculating OC ratios, with some CDOs giving deferrals of 10% of par as credit and some even 
zero credit. Interest coverage tests exist in some TruPS CDOs, and with more banks/insurance 
companies/REITs deferring interest on their TruPS debts, this usually less conservative test is 
failing at a greater rate and magnitude than the OC tests. The IC test failure affects the CDO 
waterfall mechanism in the same way as the OC test failure.  
As shown in Table 4, only six deals (6% of all deals) pass all triggers. Significantly, all six are 
pure insurance TruPS CDOs. Another 18 deals (17%) are failing the sub-bond triggers but still 
passing the senior bond triggers. Over two-thirds (71%) of the deals are failing the senior-most 
trigger, which means only the senior class of bonds is receiving P&I payments. This level of 
trigger failure is extraordinary. 
f.  Event of Default (EOD) Tests 
An EOD can occur in TruPS CDOs under certain circumstances, including but not limited to the 
following provisions: the non-payment of interest to the most senior notes outstanding, the non-
payment of principal when due and payable, the failure of an EOD overcollateralization trigger, 
and the bankruptcy/insolvency/receivership/reorganization of the co-issuers, among others. 
When an event of default is triggered, the controlling class of the transaction, usually 66 2/3% of 
the most senior notes outstanding, can instruct the trustee to declare the principal of the notes 
immediately due and payable, which effectively puts the CDO deal into the acceleration stage. 
The liquidation of the deal due to an EOD and acceleration, however, is very unlikely at present, 
given the current status of the banking industry and the illiquidity of the underlying TruPS debt 
collateral.  
While an extraordinary 94% of deals have failed OC and IC tests, only a small share (13%) have 
failed their EOD triggers. This is undoubtedly because few, if any, TruPS have actually 
defaulted. This is another unique aspect of TruPS in CDOs. While the banks have failed in many 
TruPS CDOs, until the holding company is fully liquidated, the TruPS themselves are technically 
still deferring, at least until the fifth year of deferral. Effectively, they are defaulted, and rating 
agencies track the defaulted institutions within the TruPS CDOs. But until the fifth year or 
liquidation of the TruPS themselves, they are still reported as active balances in deal structures. 
This is another unusual aspect of TruPS CDOs. 
g.  Auction Calls 
TruPS CDOs usually have 30-year final maturities due to the fact that the underlying collateral, 
the TruPS debts issued by banks, insurance companies, and REITS, have 30-year terms. The 
rating agencies, however, generally assume a weighted average life of the CDO liabilities to be 
around 10 years due to the 5-10 call option of TruPS. They do, however, model TruPS CDOs to 
maturity to estimate the “extension risk” that the TruPS do not in fact prepay. Auction calls are 
structured in most TruPS CDOs that allow an auction of the collateral assets at some point in the 16 
 
life of the transaction, usually at 10 years. If proceeds from the collateral auction would generate 
enough to retire the CDO debts, the auction sale can be consummated. If the expected proceeds 
are not enough to make the CDO debts whole, the auction will not take place but will be 
attempted at every following payment period until its success or until the collateral is completely 
amortized. Owing to the lack of trading and liquidity in the TruPS debt market and legislative 
changes, the success of auction calls by most TruPS CDOs is growing more remote, which 
probably indicates that the existing TruPS CDO bonds will experience a much longer expected 
weighted average life (WAL). We will discuss how we see the TruPS CDO market playing out 
in our concluding comments. 
IV.  Data and Summary Statistics 
a.  Data 
Our primary data source is Intex, the source data and structuring software for all 144A structured 
finance CDOs. While 144A deals are unregistered, issuers provide Intex with the deal 
prospectuses that allow Intex to properly code in the deal “waterfall” and all other features of the 
deals discussed in the last section so that analysts can generate cash flows, estimate losses, and 
price the deals for sale. Intex also provides software to enter in assumptions about expected 
losses, prepayments, severities, and discount rates to project cash flows, estimate losses, and 
price the bonds. Intex also makes available to analysts critical information on the deal, including 
deal and bond balances, bond CUSIPs, rating agency ratings, pool factors, coupons, principal and 
interest payments to each bond in the deal, and performance information for the underlying 
collateral. Each reporting period, trustees provide Intex with updated performance information, 
which it makes available. Intex is therefore the primary source for all information on each deal 
for all 144A TruPS CDO deals.  
Because of the 144A status of TruPS CDOs, however, trustees do not allow Intex to make all 
information available to analysts as they do with public deals. Most important, analysts not 
specifically investing in TruPS CDOs generally do not know the issuer of TruPS going into each 
pool. For performance, analysts observe only the cumulative default and deferral balances (and 
number of defaults/deferrals). Combining of defaults and deferrals in reporting makes estimation 
of defaults particularly difficult, since we cannot determine which institutions of the TruPS have 
defaulted and which are deferring. Likewise, cures merely lower the combined default/deferral 
balance.  
To overcome these data limitations, we were able to obtain from FTN (2011), the largest issuer 
of TruPS CDOs, information on the timing of deferrals, defaults, and cures in each of its deals.
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As shown in Table 2, FTN issues the preferred term securities shelf, one-third of the current 





our CDRs at the deal and issuer level for forecasting purposes. We use the FTN data to estimate 
our initial industry conditional default rates (CDRs) for the TruPS CDO market.  
Other sources of data are the rating agencies, deal managers, and consultants who service the 
TruPS CDO market. From these sources, we are able to gather information that feed into our 
model assumptions on such factors as shares of deferrals that default, severity rates on TruPS 
defaults, and other data relevant to generating loss projections on existing balances, all of which 
we detail below. 
Finally, we obtained data from bank call reports, SNL Securities, and the FDIC to obtain 
information on the TruPS and banking markets. These data allow us to compile data on TruPS 
issuance and compare failure rates between banks in TruPS CDOs and the overall market.  
b.  Summary Statistics 
We begin our review of TruPS CDO performance by examining issuer data through Intex, rating 
agency ratings, and data from the FDIC. Issuers in this case refer to the legal entity that issues 
the TruPS CDOs; an issuer is also commonly referred to as a “shelf.” As shown in Table 2, the 
TruPS CDO market is composed of 17 shelves, 108 separate deals totaling $58.9 billion of 
issuance, and a total of 790 separate securities, 109 equity notes and 681 bonds. Reflecting the 
fact that very few firms exercised call provisions and very few defaults have been liquidated 
through the holding companies, the current pool factors on all deals is a comparatively high 80%. 
As of March 2011, the default/deferral rate for the entire TruPS CDO market stood at 32% (27% 
as a share of original balance). While there is some variation among sub-groups we will explore 
below, poor performance exists across almost all the issuers. The analysis that follows will focus 
primarily on the 107 still-active deals and 787 securities.
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The first point of performance evaluation begins with a comparison of the original and current 
(as of June 2010) rating agency ratings, which is important since the rating agencies are the only 
entities with complete data on the universe of TruPS CDOs. To be consistent, where ratings 
differ among the rating agencies, we chose the lowest of the ratings, both at issuance and at June 
2010. In Table 5, we show that of the 681 bonds initially rated,
35 only 13 of the bonds (2%) 
currently retain their initial ratings or have been upgraded. Ninety eight percent of the bonds 
have been downgraded; of those originally rated investment grade, 87% have been downgraded 
below investment grade.  
One reason for the especially poor performance of the TruPS CDO market is that it coincides 







with seasoning or vintage as it was in the SF CDOs.
36 As shown in Figure 3, the onset of the real 
estate and financial crises in 2007-08 is when defaults and deferrals rise significantly in most 
TruPS CDO vintages. Early defaults and deferrals are often characterized by “cures” from 
deferrals, especially in the 2001 vintage. The current default/deferral rate for remaining vintages 
ranges from 28% to 42%. The 2002 book is the worst performing book of all, although this is 
partially explained by adverse selection from payoffs, as nearly 60% of the collateral is paid 
down. While the 2003 vintage paid down by $1 billion, not many other vintages have 
appreciable payoffs, and all have default/deferral rates that, if deferrals transition into defaults, 
will likely require the complete write-down of many of these the bonds. 
In searching for potential sources of performance variation with the very limited information we 
have, the only reliable indicator of performance variation is whether a CDO has insurance 
industry TruPS. We classify the 107 active TruPS CDOs into five broad industry categories 
based on information gathered from Intex and various industry sources. As shown in Table 6, by 
far the best performing group is the pure insurance TruPS group, with a current default/deferral 
rate of 5%. The next best performing group is REIT TruPS CDOs at 26%, followed by the 
hybrid bank, thrift, and insurance TruPS CDOs at 33%. The two worst classes are the ones made 
up predominantly of insured depositories, the bank & thrift (38%) and bank (41%).  
We say insurance TruPS concentration appears to be the one clear discriminator because, while 
we know which TruPS CDOs are pure insurance and which have insurance TruPS in them, we 
don’t have figures on shares of insurance TruPS in the hybrid TruPS CDOs, nor do we have 
shares of any major asset classes in the hybrids. Another important point to make about these 
classifications is that, since they are CDOs, they frequently contain other types of securities, 
including sub-debts, surplus loans, middle market securities, commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS), CMBS CDOs, and, in one case, a TruPS CDO. Without better figures on 
asset shares in these hybrid deals we cannot draw more definitive conclusions about their 
contributions to variation in performance. But we can say that the pure insurance TruPS CDOs 
are significantly outperforming any other major group and that the groups dominated by insured 
depositories, bank and bank & thrift, are performing worst. 
Another important factor of the poor performance that was not noted at the time was the 
significantly higher risk of the banks that issued TruPS into TruPS CDOs. One source of risk 
noted was that many of the banks in TruPS CDOs were unrated, unable to access capital markets 
or to engage in private placements.  Rating agencies, of course, maintain their own ratings on 
companies and securities, and they had their own methods for assessing bank risks.
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into TruPS CDOs versus those that did not. Only the three rating agencies have the complete list 
of banks issuing TruPS into TruPS CDOs. 
One way to assess relative risk among banks, at least on an ex post basis, is to compare directly 
the failure rates of banks and thrifts placed into TruPS CDOs against overall bank and thrift 
failure rates over the period. This is done in Table 7. Since we do not have TruPS CDO bank and 
thrift data, we rely on aggregates from Fitch (2010b), which reported that 176 bank and thrift 
holding companies had failed from 2007 through April 2011. Overall, 1,813 bank and thrift 
holding companies have been placed into TruPS CDOs, for a failure rate of 9.7%. This is nearly 
double the 4.7% failure rate of all FDIC-insured banks and thrifts that failed over the same 2007 
to April 2011 time frame.
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Unfortunately, we do not have information to analyze the risk profile of small banks issuing 
TruPS into TruPS CDOs versus those that did not. A more thorough analysis of risks at these 
small banks will have to wait until more information is disclosed. But it is definitely an 
important area for future research. 
V.  The Model: Development of Industry and Deal-Specific Loss Curves 
The challenge of forecasting expected losses for the 107 active TruPS CDOs was not only in 
dealing with limited data but also in making our models compatible with the valuation 
algorithms in the Intex software designed by dealers and trustees for investors. Intex provides all 
of our deal- and bond-level data, along with the coding of the deal-specific structures to generate 
cash flows. The user needs to input deal-level CDRs, CPRs, and severity rates. In this way the 
software is set up much like one is valuing an MBS pool. This is different from what the rating 
agencies do because they have information at the asset level and are able to estimate default rates 
of each institution issuing TruPS. We must work with information trustees make public to 
potential investors (or researchers like us).  
One of the features of the reporting on TruPS CDOs is that trustees only make available 
cumulative deferrals plus defaults (DDs) to non-investors each reporting period. “Deferrals” in 
this case refers to TruPS of institutions that have suspended dividend payments on their TruPS 
but have not yet filed for bankruptcy or been seized by regulators. “Defaults” refers to 
institutions that have filed for bankruptcy or been seized by regulators. This is important because 
until the institutions issuing the TruPS are liquidated, TruPS balances on defaulted institutions 
are still reported as active in the TruPS CDOs, which almost all presently are.
39 In this sense 
defaults resemble real estate owned (REO) properties in MBS deals that are still reported in the 








synonymous with delinquencies, since they represent TruPS balances at still active banks that 
have suspended dividends on their TruPS. 
In terms of the deal triggers, defaults and deferrals are regarded the same. As mentioned above, 
on most TruPS CDOs, combined DDs have exceeded their trigger levels, meaning that interest 
from the junior bonds is being diverted to the senior bonds. Both deferrals and defaults count 
toward trigger calculations in exactly the same way; that’s one reason why trustees report them 
as a combined amount.  Subject to imbedded deal triggers, interest arrears accumulate in the 
junior bonds (i.e., they “PIK”). Cash is not available to the trust until deferring TruPS cure. Thus, 
while Intex reports only the combined DD balances, we needed to find a source to distinguish 
deferrals from defaults so that we can estimate our conditional default rates (CDRs) on our 
TruPS CDOs.
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As mentioned, to estimate conditional default rates (CDRs), we were able to use data from FTN 
(2011) to construct a net DD curve. FTN’s deals are present in all major TruPS CDO groups 
mentioned in Table 6. As of June 2010, FTN’s historical cumulative DD balance as a percent of 
current balance was 28% (this had risen to 32% by the end of March 2011). The industry average 
on the non-FTN TruPS was 27.7%. This gave us confidence that the FTN data were 
representative of the TruPS CDO market and could be used to estimate industry CDRs for all 
107 TruPS CDOs. Finally, we augmented our model with assumptions from rating agency 
models, since they are the only entities that have full information on TruPS CDOs across all 
issuers.  
Our deal-specific expected loss model is as follows: 
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Cum ELi,t  = cumulative expected loss on deal i at time t, 
CDRi,t+j  = conditional default rate on deal i at time t+j, 
LGD    = loss given default, 
Perf Bali,t+j-1  = performing balance of deal i at time t+j-1, 





Multiplieri  = deal-specific multiplier applied to deal i, 
DDi,t-j    = cumulative defaults plus deferrals on deal i at t-j, 
Balancet=0  = Balance on the deal at issuance (t=0), 
PPi,t-j-1   = cumulative prepayments on deal i at time t-j-1, 
DDi,t-j-1   = cumulative deferrals and defaults on deal i at time t-j-1 and 
Cures i,t-j-1  = cures on deal i at time t-j-1. 
 
Several features of our model need elaboration. CDRs are annualized monthly default rates 
(MDRs), which are the default inputs required by Intex to project cash flows.  Since historical 
DDs occur in a lumpy fashion (see Figure 4), for forecasting purposes the decision was made to 
use an 18-month moving average to smooth the noise.  Eighteen months was chosen as the time 
period for smoothing, since TruPS CDOs report only quarterly or semi-annually, and the 18- 
month moving averages provided the smoothest curves, which proved advantageous when 
working with the Intex software. 
Note that LGD is not denoted with subscripts because we first built an industry curve from the 
FTN deal-specific data. The MDR curve estimated from deal-level data is ultimately aggregated 
to the issuer level, which we use to represent the TruPS CDO industry. Because of the lack of 
data, the same LGD assumption is applied across all deals.  
Another feature of the Intex modeling software is that CDRs are calculated only against 
performing balances, which nets out defaults, deferrals, cures, and prepayments. For the current 
stock of DD, an LGD is required 
Cures are embedded in our estimated deferral curve, since the curve is net of cures. Since cures 
are netted out, we do not need to adjust our MDRs for a probability of default (PD), as we do 
with delinquent loans in MBS pools. In effect, the MDR is the share of non-cures forecasted over 
the remaining life of each deal. In the FTN data, as of June 2010 there were eight cures totaling 
$48.4 million, and 295 accounts in deferral status totaling $2.51B.  Cures therefore represent 
2.3% of all deferrals by balance.  Thus, our model assumes a cure rate of 2.3%, or a PD 
adjustment to the MDR of 97.7%. On these we are in between the three rating agencies. 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch have implied cure rates of 10%, 0%, and 5%, respectively, on all 
future deferrals or defaults. 
Finally, for the CDR calculations, what generates deal-specific CDRs is the multiplier applied to 
each deal. Multiplieri represents the ratio of DDs of deal i at t=0 to the average DD on the FTN 
deals at t=0 (DDFTN,t=0), with some adjustments described below. Each TruPS CDO receives a 
level adjustment to the MDR curve by Equation (5) below.  
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A key adjustment we make is to place a floor of 20% on the multiplier. The deal-specific 
multipliers for these 107 deals ranged from 0 to 292%. The deals with the highest multipliers 
were seasoned deals with very low pool factors due to pool burnout. For the deals with zero or 
very low losses we placed a 20% floor on the multipliers, which gave lifetime default rates more 
comparable to Baa-rated firms based on Moody’s idealized default probability tables.
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For the empirical estimation of the CDR curves, we investigated several model specifications, 
ultimately settling on a unit root specification. From FTN, we had the issuance date of each deal; 
the month of each deferral, default and cure; and the collateral type, as described in Table 6. It 
was initially hoped that more accurate forecasts could be formed from taking information about 
the CDOs’ age into account. A matrix of DD rates was created from the asset data consisting of 
observations of these rates at a given calendar date across assets of different ages.  Next a low 
rank approximation to this matrix was formed by minimizing the squared differences between 
the observed rates and those calculated as an outer product of two vectors.
42  Unfortunately, the 
age profile was found to be essentially nothing but noise, and the time-varying component was 
nearly identical to a simple average of monthly rates across all assets over calendar time. This is 
apparent from Figure 3 when observing how the time profile of DDs shot up in late 2007 as the 
financial crisis took hold, but did so for all vintages. Given this we concluded that there was very 
little in the age of a deal that would improve forecast accuracy, and it was fine to use a simple 
average over observed rates to form a base CDR forecast. 
Limited historical performance for TruPS, particularly in a stress environment, also makes 
forecasting future DDs more an art than a science.  Fortunately, we can draw on the Merton 
(1974) model of firm default to justify a forecast that is very plausible—at least in the near term.  
In Merton’s model, a firm defaults if the market value of its assets falls below its liabilities.  We 
argue that a similar process is driving defaults and deferrals among the firms’ TruPS that make 
up a TruPS CDO.  A firm is forced to defer interest payments or default outright as the value of 
its assets gets close to, or falls below, its liabilities. The typical Merton assumption is that the 
value of a firm’s assets is driven by a geometric Brownian motion.  Assuming that a firm’s 
liabilities don’t change, we reason that the probability of default at any time can be expressed by 
evaluating the cumulative density function (CDF) of a normal random variable at the difference 
between the log of its assets’ value and the log of its liabilities.  This difference evolves as a 
random walk unit root process as long as the firm’s liabilities don’t change.  If we apply an 











component that closely tracks the log asset process; we would expect this component to closely 
resemble a unit-root process.  We have extracted this component and it certainly passes the 
standard tests for unit roots.
43  We argue therefore that the best short-term forecast of DD rates is 
the current DD rate. 
Our historical information on defaults and deferrals from FTN and our forecasted base industry 
CDR curve is represented in Figure 4. Given the theoretical discussion above, our key 
assumption is that the current trend of defaults and deferrals will continue for the next 24 months 
(from June 2010), consistent with this process being modeled well in the short run as a unit root.  
The extension of the current 18-month average DD rate out 24 months is consistent with rating 
agency assumptions and the fact that the FDIC’s list of problem banks continues to grow.
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At longer horizons, the assumptions of the simple Merton framework are less plausible.  In 
particular, we expect firms’ liabilities to change markedly as firms respond to the decline in the 
value of their assets. We also know that regulatory actions against banks require them to 
restructure their assets and liabilities to raise capital or face seizure, which rating agencies have 
noted is a source of the rise in deferrals (Fitch (2010b)). Consequently, we conjecture that bank 
defaults will peak in mid-2012 and taper off significantly after that. After mid-2012, we reduce 
our DD forecast to 3% for months 25-36, 1.5% for months 37-48, and .25% thereafter for the 
remaining lives of the deals.  These step-level forecasts of 3%, 1.5% and 0.25% are blended in 
with the prior 17 months to produce our industry curve depicted by the dotted line in Figure 4, 
which starts after June 2012.  The final step is to multiply this industry curve by Multiplieri to 
generate deal-specific CDR curves. 
Finally, our assumptions for CPRs and LGDs are calculated as follows. For CPRs, we were able 
to obtain historical prepayment rates directly from Intex. As of June 2010, the rolling 18-month 
average voluntary conditional prepayment rate (CPR) was 1.38% for all TruPS. A 1% CPR was 
used for model projections, which approximates the most recent empirically observed 
performance and takes into consideration that issuers will have more restricted opportunities to 














For LGDs, all three rating agencies assume no recoveries, at least for the existing TruPS in the 
CDOs, with assumptions of recoveries coming for future expected defaults. The deeply 
subordinated nature of the TruPS, just above perpetual preferred stock, suggests that recoveries 
should be zero or very small. Recent history suggests that investors have been able to extract 
some recoveries out of their TruPS and that banks merging with deferring banks have been 
curing some TruPS. Fitch (2011) reported for the first time that a deferring bank completed a 
tender offer for a TruPS in a TruPS CDO in January 2011 with a recovery of 21%. Six CDOs 
sold a defaulted bank’s TruPS for an average recovery of 13% during December 2010 and 
January 2011. Furthermore, nine TruPS CDOs entered into agreements with a third party, 
essentially a sub-servicer, to work out recoveries from 32 defaulted banks, offering hope that 
additional recoveries are forthcoming. For these reasons, we apply Moody’s 10% recovery figure 
to both existing TruPS and future TruPS.
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While FTN data give us additional information on performance not found in Intex, we must 
acknowledge that our highly stylized model is best understood as a benchmark model, reflective 
of average expected losses and prices across the TruPS CDO market rather than precise estimates 
for individual securities. Without specific information on the assets (i.e., the names of the firms 
that issued the TruPS in the CDOs) or even on which specific assets are deferring or have 
defaulted, we must work with the information we have, which is the cumulative DDs out of 
Intex. This is why an important part of our model validation is comparing our expected loss 
estimates against models that use the asset-level detail, namely, those from the rating agencies, 
which we do next.  
VI.  Results: Validation and Loss Forecasts 
a.  Validation 
Our model assumptions are now tested by comparing our model forecasts, run through Intex, on 
a deal-by-deal basis to Moody’s for the comparable time period over which the Moody’s model 
was estimated, which was mid-2010.  Rating agencies are the best source for validation, since, as 
mentioned, they are the only entities provided with collateral-level information across all major 
securities issuers. Moody’s was chosen because, of the three major rating agencies, it provided 
deal-by-deal figures for most of the securities for which we could develop cumulative loss 
estimates to use for validation against our own model.   
Moody’s published an expected collateral loss table in a special report
 on CDOs (Moody’s 
(2010a)). Moody’s report estimated cumulative collateral losses for 87 deals, over 80% of the 





up against our model’s cumulative loss forecasts in mid-2010 for the same 87 deals to get a 
direct comparison.
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Our forecasted cumulative loss estimates came in as we had hoped, lower than Moody’s on 
average, with outliers explained either by data errors or information on the underlying assets we 
could not observe because Moody’s had access to the individual issuers of TruPS. As shown in 
Table 8, our cumulative loss forecasts were 4.4% lower, on average, than Moody’s, with a lower 
median difference of 3.1% and a standard deviation of 6.7%. We had hoped for lower loss 
estimates because, as we discussed in Section 2 above, Moody’s made some adjustments to its 
models, such as truncating the distributions on bank ratings at Baa2, which seemed overly 
conservative to us. The very high standard deviation was partly driven by outliers. We believe 
the two highest outliers (-28% and -23%) are data errors at Moody’s. In the case of the outlier for 
which we were much higher, at +13%, Moody’s had lifetime cumulative losses lower than 
current default and deferral rates. This is either an error or Moody’s must have observed 
something in the underlying collateral that we could not observe. We also noticed that Moody’s 
had much higher cumulative losses than we did on the insurance TruPS CDOs, by far the best-
performing group, driven by Moody’s much higher lifetime cumulative loss assumptions on the 
insurance sector. But overall, our model validated as we had hoped.  
As part of our validation, we also analyze our out-of-sample results, which we depict in Figure 5. 
Note that our forecasted near-term DD assumption has been coming down as the new DDs have 
declined significantly, a self-correcting feature of our model. While our forecasted DD curve has 
been slightly higher than actual, it has performed reasonably well, on average. Over the nine-
month out-of-sample period from July 2010 to March 2011, the root mean square error (RMSE) 
of the actual against the predicted lines in Figure 5 is 1.08%, which is around 9% off the actual 
average DD rate. Thus, we believe our model provides a reasonably conservative benchmark for 
estimating expected losses and performs reasonably well out of sample. 
b.  Expected Losses on Bonds 
With forecasts from our benchmark model we gain a fairly complete picture of our ultimate 
expected losses for the TruPS CDO market. Results are summarized in Table 9.  The first group 
of 327 securities represents those for which existing defaults and deferrals are high enough to 
result in a complete write-down of these securities. In other words, even if the TruPS in these 
deals suffer no additional defaults, if the existing DDs have a 10% recovery or less (standard 
baseline assumptions), these 327 securities will be fully written down, 42% of all TruPS CDO 
bonds and equity tranches. Because they are generally most junior in the capital structure, they 







that we estimate will be partially written down with existing DDs, fully written down when 
adding in our forecasted losses. The next group of 15 securities has enough existing 
subordination so that they will not suffer losses with existing DDs, but we expect them to be 
fully written down based on our forecasts. All told, we forecast 58% of all securities, 38% of 
total current balances, will be fully written down.  
We forecast that a smaller subset of bonds will be partially written down. Again, in Table 9, we 
forecast 27 securities, totaling $2.7 billion, to suffer write-downs between 50 to 99%, while 
another 27 securities, totaling $3.5 billion, will suffer write-downs between 0 and 50%. Finally, 
we forecast 279 securities, 36% of total bonds, and 50% by current balance, to suffer no write-
downs. Stated differently, we estimate that 77% of all TruPS CDO securities will suffer full or 
partial write-downs. All told, we estimate security losses will total $21.4 billion, 43% of April 
2011 balances. By original issuance balance, $58.9 billion, we estimate 36% will be written 
down.  
A more detailed cut by original bond ratings shows that losses are concentrated mostly in bonds 
originally rated A or lower, with the originally AAA-rated bonds mostly expected to have no 
write-downs. As shown in Table 10, for bonds originally rated senior AAA, we forecast that 84% 
(109 of 129) will suffer no losses. None are expected to be fully written down. This is not 
surprising, since most deals’ triggers have already tripped, which means that cash is being 
diverted from lower-rated bonds to pay down the senior-most bonds. We do estimate that 16% of 
the senior AAA bonds will suffer some losses. For the junior AAA-rated bonds, 76% (90 of 118) 
are expected to suffer no write-downs, while 17% are forecasted to be fully written down (20 of 
118). All told, we estimate that 81% of the AAA-rated bonds (199 of 247) will suffer no loss of 
principal, while 19% (48 of 247) will suffer some loss or be fully written down. 
For AA-rated bonds, 43% are estimated to fully pay off, while 48% are expected to be fully 
written down. For bonds originally A-rated, we estimate 14% will suffer no write-downs, while 
81% will be fully written down. For bonds originally rated BBB or BB, we estimate complete 
write-downs on 90% and 95%, respectively. The B-rated bonds expected to suffer no losses are 
mostly all from insurance TruPS CDOs. There is also no clear monotonic pattern to these full 
write-downs. For example, 95% of BB-rated bonds are expected to be fully written down, while 
92% of the equity tranches are expected to be fully written down.
47  
We should emphasize again that these are benchmark figures estimated from industry averages. 
If recoveries are higher from defaulted banks, or if deferring banks cure in greater numbers than 
have occurred to date, our figures will come down. Our unit root assumption and the multipliers 
in our model adjust with the market, so if credit conditions at banks improve significantly in the 






With access to asset-level detail, analysts can look across the actual financial institutions 
themselves, which will result in potentially more accurate forecasts than our benchmarks. We 
caution that Moody’s already has this detail, and their lifetime loss figures are higher than ours. 
While we have reason to believe Moody’s figures may be too high based on its 2008 model 
adjustments discussed above,
48 we feel that our assumptions are not overly conservative, which 
is why our loss estimates represent good benchmarks. We would also close by pointing out that, 
with any model, the full write-down of the 327 securities that are forecasted to be fully written 
down with existing DDs appears most certain. These are dominated by the B-rated and equity 
tranches of the non-insurance TruPS CDOs.  
c.  Estimating Other Than Temporary Impairment (OTTI) Losses  
 
In April  2009 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued revised guidance 
(FASB 2009) in part to address concerns that current market conditions caused temporary 
declines in value that do not reflect cash flows that will actually be collected for non‐traded debt 
securities. In this section, we will describe how current guidance is used to calculate OTTI 
prices. Then we will value these securities based on our forecasted losses described above.  
The new guidance changed the method for determining whether a debt security is OTTI and 
where the impairment loss is recognized in the financial statements. Under this guidance, firms 
are permitted to separate credit losses on debt securities from losses due to temporary 
impairment if the firm can assert that it does not intend to sell the security and it is “more likely 
than not” it will not be required to sell the security before recovery of its amortized cost basis. 
Temporary impairment reflects factors such as liquidity and market sentiment, factors that can be 
quite volatile and change over time. Owing to the highly illiquid nature of the TruPS CDO 
market, they certainly count as non-traded debt securities. 
 
The decision sequence for both available for sale (AFS) and held to maturity (HTM) debt 
securities and the appropriate valuation method is depicted in Figure 6. If a firm intends to sell a 
security in an unrealized loss position, it recognizes an impairment loss equal to the full 
difference between the amortized cost basis and the fair value of those securities (the bottom left 
box in Figure 6). If the firm does not intend to sell the security and it is “more likely than not” 
that the firm will not be required to sell the security before recovery of its amortized cost basis, 
only the credit loss portion of OTTI is recognized in earnings, whereas the portion of OTTI due 
to other factors is included as a separate component of accumulated other comprehensive income 
(AOCI). The credit loss portion of OTTI is calculated as the difference between the present value 
of the security’s expected cash flows and its amortized cost basis reported on the balance sheet, 







We will describe and then represent FASB 2009 guidance for estimating OTTI prices for our 785 
TruPS CDO securities. First, we use the losses estimated above as our OTTI losses. Each period 
the Intex software will generate cash flows that incorporate specific cash flows for each bond 
based on the priority of payment (or “waterfall” rules) stipulated in each deal prospectus and 
modeled in Intex. Also modeled in Intex are subordination rules, triggers, expenses, hedging 
costs, and other aspects of each deal described in Section 3 above.  
 
The only remaining issue for estimation of our OTTI price is the choice of the appropriate 
discount rate.  FASB 2009 guidance for OTTI calls for discounting expected losses at the 
purchase yield of the security. Since we do not know the purchase yield for each investor, we 
price each security as if it was purchased at its par values. Thus, for our discount rate, we use the 
par coupon rate for fixed-rate indexed securities or the spot rate of the index plus the discount 
margin for floating rate bonds. Within Intex, this can be done directly by generating cash flows 
for each time period, as done above, and discounting them by the appropriate discount rate. The 
discounted OTTI price is as follows: 
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where for floating rate securities 
   ,      rDM i   z t,j , 
for fixed-rate securities 
   ,      rcoup i  
and for equity securities 




Pricei,OTTI  = Price of security i reflecting its OTTI price, 
Cash Flowsj,t+i = cash flows generated for security i at t+j, 
rDM(i)  = constant discount margin for security i, 
z,t,j  = j-period LIBOR spot rate at time t, 
rcoup(i)  = the coupon rate for fixed-rate securities, 





Balancei,t=0  = Balance of security i at t=0. 
 
In Table 11, we summarize our OTTI price estimates. The  center column at 100% represents our 
expected weighted average discounted prices as a percent of par value, i.e., the OTTI prices for 
each major tranche class. Senior bonds have OTTI prices of about 97 cents and about 93 cents 
for the junior AAA bonds. Because triggers are diverting cash flows to the AAA classes, prices 
drop off significantly after that, consistent with losses rising significantly as in the previous 
section. The AA class prices out at 56 cents on down to about 1 cent for the BB bonds, and about 
4 cents for the equity tranches.  
 
To show the sensitivity of our loss estimates, we also provide OTTI prices for ranges of our 
expected loss curves, from 0 to 200%. Of great interest is the zero percent loss column because it 
represents prices that we can expect if TruPS CDO securities experience no future losses above 
losses generated from current defaults and deferrals. In this case, AAA bonds will recover full 
value, with AA bonds recovering around 98 cents. But again, lower rated bonds suffer 
substantial deterioration in values, even in these close-to-best-case scenarios, with prices ranging 
from 7 to 89 cents.  
 
At the other extreme, at twice our estimated loss curve, weighted average prices are still positive 
for the A-rated bonds and the B-rated insurance TruPS CDOs. At what we consider a worst case 
for our benchmark model, the senior AAA-rated bonds still retain about 90% of their value, the 
junior AAA-rated bonds 78%, falling off significantly after that.
50 The positive values for the B-
rated tranches are driven mainly by the insurance TruPS CDOs, whose current DDs are low 
enough so that they retain value even in the 200% scenario.  
 
VII.  Conclusions and Lessons Learned 
This paper investigates the development and performance of the TruPS CDO market. While a 
niche part of the structured finance CDO market at $60 billion of issuance, the large number of 
banks issuing TruPS into TruPS CDOs and the effects of TruPS on bank resolutions has had 
significant impacts on the small to medium-sized banking industry in the U.S. and also on the 
FDIC insurance fund through resolution of failed banks. More broadly, this in-depth study of the 
TruPS CDO market is another example of issues that occurred in the broader structured products 
market. This in-depth study of the TruPS CDO market  provides important insights into how 
markets respond to regulations; the symbiotic relationship between investment banks and rating 
agencies in developing models and ratings; how ratings are adjusted over time; and, most 





untraded securities. Thus, this study provides insights and lessons learned not just for the TruPS 
CDO market but for all structured products markets. 
Before engaging in a lessons learned, we need to acknowledge that the TruPS CDO market 
represented a positive market response to a real need. Small, unrated banks were often not able to 
place their debt except for the TruPS CDO. Without this structure, many small banks lacked the 
ability to issue TruPS. The TruPS CDO was thus a positive capital markets response to that need.  
The poor performance of TruPS CDOs is first and foremost a direct, and largely unanticipated, 
result of the financial crisis and the broad-based nature of the real estate downturn. Record low 
numbers of bank failures over the 2003-2007 period as well as the booming real estate market 
also help explain the concentrations of issuance volume in these years. The very favorable 
market conditions combined with good returns relative to other structured finance products also 
may explain why banks became primary investors in securities in their own market.  
Having said this, the very favorable market conditions masked underlying risks. Since bank 
TruPS CDOs were made up mainly of debt of banks too small to be rated, and since these banks 
largely invested in commercial real estate (CRE), these deals were, in effect, indirect investments 
in unrated and deeply subordinated CRE bonds. By comparison, even the riskiest of the synthetic 
mezzanine subprime CDOs were composed of bonds at least initially rated investment grade.  
But having banks both issue TruPS and hold each other’s debt greatly increased those risks, as 
did the tendency to include the same TruPS issuers in many different CDOs. Banks turned out to 
be the primary customer for the lower-rated tranches of TruPS CDOs, many of which all models 
estimate are likely to be fully written down. The rationale for such holdings appeared to be that 
banks were investing in their own industry, which they ostensibly knew the risks of better than 
others. While this may not be uncommon for such a niche class of securities, it undoubtedly 
increased these risks once the downturn commenced. We show that banks’ being the primary 
investors of the TruPS CDOs in their own industry was publicly reported in the investment 
banking literature as early as 2004, but none of the major players, dealers or rating agencies, 
expressed any concerns or made significant model adjustments until after the TruPS CDO 
market came undone. Since ratings do not take into account the investor base of a deal, nor do 
rating agencies keep track of who investors are, this would have to fall to the dealers to police. 
These agents are conflicted when a primary motive is to generate business. The Dodd-Frank Act 
addresses this in part by establishing a new Office of Financial Research (OFR)
51 that could 
monitor these instruments better. Regulators also need to do more by proactively monitoring 
new—and existing—markets.  
The failure of banks’ internal risk management practices is also a factor in these purchases. As 





banks appeared to be largely relying on ratings, contrary to sound risk management practices. 
When examining subordination levels and securities spreads, we see much more conservative 
valuations in the more broadly owned AAA class than in the bank-dominated mezzanine classes.  
There was a regulatory arbitrage point to these investments as well. Banks that hold each other’s 
equity are not allowed to count these as capital, but no such restrictions were placed on TruPS 
CDO investments at banks, which are hybrid debt/equity TruPS. Here the opaqueness of the 
structure itself and the limited disclosure made it difficult for regulators to actually determine 
how to account for TruPS CDOs for regulatory accounting purposes. Had banks been required to 
deduct portions of their TruPS CDO investments from capital, this may have limited bank 
investments in TruPS CDOs, which, in retrospect, would not have been a bad thing.  
Future TruPS CDO issuance was dead long before Dodd-Frank placed restrictions on TruPS as 
regulatory capital. More important is the highly uncertain future of existing deals. Defaulting 
BHCs have yet to resolve their TruPS, but this will have to be done at least by their fifth year of 
deferral, which is the limit to which they can defer without defaulting. Rating agencies are 
making a conservative assumption that all existing deferrals are leading to defaults with little or 
no recovery. This has created disagreements among analysts responsible for conducting 
valuations. More work needs to be done to determine how these deferrals will play out and what 
assumptions are most reasonable to make regarding recoveries. In the meantime, efforts to 
resolve defaulted bank TruPS claims could add greater clarity to assumptions on recoveries so 
critical to loss forecasts. 
As for current valuations of bonds and their accounting, much work needs to be done. We see 
two urgent issues here requiring prompt action. First, in order to resolve discrepancies in pricing, 
issuers should make public the names of the TruPS assets in all TruPS CDOs. This could easily 
happen in the next reporting cycle, at little cost to trustees or collateral managers. This is 
something rating agencies have requested for years, and something issuers should do 
immediately.  
A critical gap also exists in accounting policy that needs urgent attention. FASB 2009 
established rules for assessing valuations for allocation of fair values between OTTI and AOCI 
for non-traded securities, which we demonstrate can be consistently applied in practice. This is a 
positive. Yet on evaluating the quality of the valuations themselves, accountants frequently attest 
that they are not responsible for assessing the quality of the models used to conduct valuations. 
But if accountants don’t evaluate the models, who does? In cases where accounting firms do not 
provide this assessment, we believe this is a gap that regulators need to fill. In many cases this 
gap is filled by outside consultants, a situation where expertise and the quality of valuations can 
vary greatly. We believe regulators need to serve as arbiters here, in effect, rating the raters. 
Banks should also all be disclosing their securities holdings in their investment portfolios to 
regulators each quarter. For these, bank regulators should follow the model adopted by the 32 
 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which receives from members 
CUSIPs and other information on investment portfolios so that regulators can do a full evaluation 
of all holdings in insurers’ investment portfolios. Applying models like the one we developed to 
all banks’ TruPS CDO holdings would offer a consistent, independent assessment to compare 
with banks’ internal analyses. Exactly this type of exercise was conducted as part of the 2008 
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), commonly referred to as the “stress tests,” 
and the 2011 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise for the largest 
banks. With a simple NAIC-style schedule, this type of analysis could be extended to smaller 
banks’ investment portfolios, with enormous gains in information and the quality and 
consistency of regulatory supervision. 
Finally, what is needed in ABS/MBS markets is objective, critical analysis from analysts and 
researchers who are not profiting in any way from new issuance. An important aspect of the 
development of the TruPS CDO market, and of structured finance markets in general, is the 
dominance of analysis by companies directly profiting from new issuance. This is not unusual, 
and, in fact, is necessary. Innovation is greatest with economic incentives, and this process 
should not be hampered by regulation. Having said this, a more critical analysis of these deals 
may well have uncovered the high-risk nature of these investments that appeared to be captured 
in the large spreads and exceptional amounts of subordination in the AAA-rated senior classes of 
TruPS CDOs.
52 More important, as the above-mentioned market concentrations became clearer, 
rating agency and issuer pricing models should have taken more account of this. In some sense 
this is a gap fueled by the unregistered status of the TruPS CDO and rating agencies’ inability to 
capture investor-level information. But the concentrated investor base was reported publicly as 
early as 2004, so it should not have come as a surprise. We also point out that the model used to 
justify the zero inter-regional correlation assumption, apparently critical to the development of 
the single industry TruPS CDO market, was based on a model developed for an unrelated class 
of securities. 
The best response to this is for academics and policymakers to take a much more active role in 
conducting research on evolving—and existing—structured product markets. A group of 
objective, dispassionate analyses would fill a much needed void. Indeed, this is purportedly a 
goal of the OFR; it should become one for regulators as well. For academics, research in these 
areas offers interesting and rewarding research opportunities, which should be incentive enough 
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Insurance Insurance REIT Total
2000 553 200 753
2001 03 , 3 7 6
2002 337 4,256 359 4,953
2003 1,413 2,802 1,528 2,049 7,793
2004 1,848 2,537 2,312 1,054 7,751
2005 1,055 872 4,651 3,224 9,803
2006 362 9,220 5,008 14,590
2007 611 539 5,943 2,802 9,895




















FTN Financial Capital Markets 31 209 1,718 $20,793M $16,267M 32.7% 0.78
Merrill Lynch 20 192 1,341 12,443M 10,077M 23.8% 0.81
Bear Stearns 14 108 833 7,568M 6,255M 13.2% 0.83
Credit Suisse  10 75 450 3,675M 3,010M 6.3% 0.82
JPMorgan 6 66 349 3,585M 3,390M 6.9% 0.95
Sandler O'Neill & Partners 9 42 324 3,219M 2,168M 4.5% 0.67
ABN AMRO 3 25 284 1,862M 1,635M 3.6% 0.88
Salomon Smith Barney 4 12 93 1,885M 841M 1.8% 0.45
Citigroup 3 17 144 1,152M 1,031M 2.1% 0.90
Cohen & Company Securities  1 5 58 509M 432M 1.0% 0.85
Vining Sparks IBG  1 7 56 409M 401M 0.8% 0.98
Deutsche Bank Securities  1 8 42 346M 324M 0.6% 0.94
Wachovia 1 5 70 342M 324M 0.7% 0.95
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods 1 3 33 311M 232M 0.6% 0.74
Morgan Stanley 1 7 32 302M 278M 0.6% 0.92
RBS Greenwich Capital  1 6 52 312M 278M 0.6% 0.89
1st Union 1 3 18 200M 125M 0.3% 0.62



















Senior AAA 40% 37% 53% 51% 50% 48% 48% 47% 48% 30%
Junior AAA NA NA 43% 43% 39% 37% 38% 37% 39% 24%
 AA NA NA 25% 35% 29% 27% 26% 26% 27% 13%
 A 7% 9% 10% 12% 11% 14% 14% 14% 12% 11%
 BBB 9% 8% 8% 9% 8% 9% 7% 8% 8% 6%
 BB NA NA NA NA 8% 8% 5% 7% 6% 4%
Deal Balances $753 $3,376 $4,953 $7,806 $7,751 $9,803 $14,590 $9,895















Senior AAA N A 1 0 0 8 98 15 33 83 23 5 5 0 4 0 10
Junior AAA NA NA 92 93 74 51 43 46 61 60 1
 AA NA NA 106 116 117 78 65 72 77 84 (7)
 A NA 223 191 175 163 137 126 112 155 177 (22)
 BBB NA 310 319 308 291 253 248 229 257 331 (74)








Table 4 - TruPS CDO OC/IC Trigger Status 
 
 






























(1) 12 19 8 44 65 50 15 11 3 21 248 5% 95% 67%
AA  239 2 1 3 4 1 2 6 8 70% 100% 98%
A 3 16 5 12 184 7 227 0% 100% 100%
BBB
(2) 11 3 7 1 8 5 9 8 1% 99% 99%
BB 12 0 2 1 0% 100% NA
NR 109 109 NA NA NA





























Bank 20 0.66 $8B $5B $2B 27% 41%
Bank & Thrift 25 0.71 $11B $7B $3B 27% 38%
Bank & Thrift & Insurance 40 0.93 $25B $24B $8B 31% 33%
Insurance 9 0.77 $3B $3B $B 4% 5%
REIT 13 0.87 $9B $8B $2B 23% 26%



























Mean ‐4.44% (28%) 1
Standard Error 0.72% (25%) 0
Median ‐3.10% (22%) 1
Standard Deviation 6.69% (19%) 0
Range 40.57% (16%) 2
Minimum ‐27.76% (13%) 6
Maximum 12.81% (10%) 6
































Full Write Down with Existing D/D 327 $11,836 42% 24% $11,836
Partial Write Down with Existing D/D, Full W/D with Forecast 110 $6,396 14% 13% $6,396
No Write Down with Existing D/D, Full WD with Forecast 15 $629 2% 1% $629
Write Downs >50%‐99% with Forecast 27 $2,754 3% 5% $1,904
Write Downs >0%‐50% with Forecast 27 $3,470 3% 7% $648
No Write Down with Forecast 279 $25,097 36% 50% $0








Table 10 TruPS Loss Estimates by Seniority
 
Current Subordination
vs. Default Analysis No WD < 50% WD < 100% WD Full WD Total
Sr. AAA
No Write Down 108 11 5 124
Partial Write Down 131 5
Total Sr. AAA 109 14 6 0 129
% Total 84% 11% 5% 0% 129
Jr. AAA
No Write Down 87 4 2 9 102
Partial Write Down 311 91 4
Full Write Down 22
Total Jr. AAA 90 5 3 20 118
% Total 76% 4% 3% 17%
AA 
No Write Down 24 1 4 29
Partial Write Down 13 2 5 24 44
Full Write Down 14 14
Total AA  37 3 5 42 87
% Total 43% 3% 6% 48%
A
No Write Down 25 1 3 1 30
Partial Write Down 625 6 9 8 2
Full Write Down 115 115
Total A 31 3 8 185 227
% Total 14% 1% 4% 81%
BBB
No Write Down 91 1 0
Partial Write Down 16 7
Full Write Down 80 80




Full Write Down 12 0 2 1
Total BB 12 0 2 1
% Total 5% 100%
Equity
Partial Write Down 225 21 1
Full Write Down 95 95
Total Equity 225 9 7 1 0 6












Rating in $mm Bonds 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200%
Sr. AAA 21,777 129 99.96 99.59 99.06 98.31 97.23 96.06 94.52 92.61 90.28
Jr. AAA 6,479 118 98.34 97.79 96.72 95.03 93.36 90.49 87.36 82.92 78.37
AA  3,902 87 88.87 82.53 74.29 65.55 56.22 46.42 37.27 30.72 25.95
A 10,198 227 57.78 49.36 41.65 34.98 29.60 25.52 22.53 20.23 18.45
BBB 2,909 97 27.16 21.07 17.78 15.27 12.98 11.19 9.68 8.96 8.38
BB 543 21 6.02 2.67 1.21 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.13 0.45












Notes:  Tranche percentages are industry averages computed from Intex.
(*)  Undercollateralization due to discounting of bonds at Closing
Trust Preferred Security (TruPS) Trust Preferred CDO (TruPS CDO)
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TruPS CDO Cum Def/Def as a % of Collateral Balance





















































































































































































































































































































































OTTI Decision Tree for Available for Sale (AFS) and Held to Maturity (HTM) Debt Securities 








































Source: Financial Sector Analysis, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Fair Value of 
the security is 
less than 
Amortized 
Cost 
 
No OTTI is recorded 
Firm Intends to sell 
or it is “more likely 
than not” the firm 
will be required to 
sell before recovery 
of the security’s 
amortized cost 
Other than 
temporary 
Impairment 
due to credit 
100% of impairment is 
recorded in earnings 
(Fair Value – Amortized Cost) 
Credit loss portion (<=100% of 
OTTI) is recorded in earnings; 
non‐credit loss portion is 
recorded in Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income (AOCI)
 
No OTTI is recorded 
This flow chart demonstrates the FASB 157 OTTI accounting implications for AFS and HTM 
securities. 